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C O N D I T I O N A L S R. A. Briggs
Conditionals are sentences that propose a scenario (which may or may
not be the actual scenario), then go on to say something about what
would happen in that scenario.1 In English, they are typically expressed
by ‘if. . . then. . . ’ statements. Examples of conditionals include:
1. If the Axiom of Choice is true, then every set can be well ordered.
2. You will probably get lung cancer if you smoke.
3. If the syrup forms a soft ball when you drop it into cold water, then
it is between 112 and 115 degrees Celsius.
4. If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over.
5. When I’m queen, you will be sorry.
In general, a conditional is formed from two smaller statements: an
antecedent (the supposition that typically comes directly after ‘if’) and a
consequent (the statement that typically comes later in the sentence, and
is sometimes preceded by ‘then’). In the above examples, the antecedents
are:
1. The Axiom of Choice is true.
2. You smoke.
3. The syrup forms a soft ball when you drop it into cold water.
4. Kangaroos had no tails. (Or perhaps: Kangaroos have no tails.)
5. I’m queen.
while the consequents are:
1. Every set can be well ordered.
2. You will probably get lung cancer. (Or perhaps: You will get lung
cancer.)
3. The syrup is between 112 and 115 degrees Celsius.
4. Kangaroos would topple over. (Or perhaps: Kangaroos topple over.)
5. You will be sorry.
1 I take this framing, which emphasizes the contents of conditionals rather than their
grammatical form, from (von Fintel, 2011).
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1 why care about conditionals?
Conditionals are useful for a variety of everyday tasks, including decision
making, prediction, explanation, and imagination.
When making a decision, you should aim to choose an act such that, if
you (were to) perform it, a good outcome is (or would be) likely to result.
Decision theory codifies this intuition in formal terms, and often makes
explicit use of conditionals (Gibbard & Harper, 1981; Vinci, 1988; Bradley,
2000; Cantwell, 2013).
Conditionals are also useful for deriving predictions and explanations
from theoretical models. If I am not sure which model of climate change
to accept, I can use conditionals to reason about how much the earth’s
temperature will increase if each of the models under consideration is true.
To check whether a model explains the data I have already observed, I can
use conditionals to check whether, if a given model is true, my data should
be expected. (For a defense of conditionals in scientific explanation, see
Woodward, 2004; for a defense of conditionals in historical explanation,
see Reiss, 2009, and Nolan, 2013.)
Children’s pretend play is both developmentally important, and closely
related to reasoning with conditionals. Amsel and Smalley (2000), Dias and
Harris (1990), Gopnik (2009), Harris (2000), Lillard (2001), and K. Walton
(1990) argue that children’s pretense (for example, pretending a banana
is a telephone), involves constructing an alternative scenario to what is
known or believed to be true, and then reasoning about what would
happen in that scenario. While children can express their thoughts about
pretend scenarios without the explicit use of conditionals, conditionals
are particularly well suited to expressing these thoughts. Weisberg and
Gopnik (2013) argue that the ability to reason about non-actual scenarios
is crucial to learning from and planning for the actual world, since it
enables children to generate and compare a range of alternative models of
reality. Krzyzanowska (2013) argues that the mechanism that lets children
evaluate conditionals is the same as the one that lets them attribute false
beliefs to others.
In addition to playing a crucial role in everyday reasoning and cognitive
development, conditionals do work in philosophical analyses of a variety of
concepts. Any philosophical idea that relies on the notion of dependence is
ripe for a conditional analysis: to say that one thing e depends on a second
thing c is arguably to say that if c is one way, then e is some corresponding
way, and if c is a different way, then e is a correspondingly different
way. Conditionals famously appear in analyses of causation (see Menzies,
2014, and Collins, Hall, and Paul, 2004, for overviews), dispositions (Prior,
Pargetter, & Jackson, 1982; Choi, 2006, 2009), knowledge (Nozick, 1981;
Sosa, 1999), and freedom (Moore, 1912; Ayer, 1954).
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Finally, conditionals figure in several common patterns of reasoning, to
which we now turn.
2 common patterns of reasoning
The following argument forms look compelling in ordinary, natural-
language arguments (though we will see that all of them have putative
counterexamples). Different formal theories of conditionals yield different
verdicts about which are valid.
2.1 Modus Ponens
Modus ponens is the inference form:
1. If A, then C.
2. A.
∴ C.
Modus ponens is one of the most central—arguably the most central—of
the inference forms involving conditionals. Bobzien (2002) traces its roots
back to Aristotle’s hypothetical syllogisms, and through the logic of the
Peripatetics and antiquity. Gillon (2011) notes that modus ponens was a
common inference pattern in Pre-Classical Indian philosophy, and quotes
a representative argument in which the third-century Buddhist logician
Moggaliputta Tissa explicitly notes the inconsistency of simultaneously
believing ‘if A, then C’, ‘A’, and ‘not C’. Ryle (1950) even advances a theory
of conditionals based entirely on their ability to license modus ponens: an
utterance of ‘if A then C’ is an ‘inference ticket’ that allows one to move
from the premise A to the conclusion C.
Despite its perennial popularity, there are apparent counterexamples
to modus ponens. One sort (McGee, 1985) involves nested conditionals.
Suppose you see a fisherman with something caught in his net. You are
almost sure it is a fish, but the next likeliest option is that it is a frog. McGee
argues that you should accept the premises of the following argument, but
not the conclusion (since, if the animal has lungs, then it is not a fish but a
frog).
1. If that is a fish, then if it has lungs, it’s a lungfish.
2. That is a fish.
∴ If it has lungs, it’s a lungfish.
Another type of apparent counterexample (Kolodny & MacFarlane,
2010; Darwall, 1983) involves ‘ought’s or ‘should’s. Consider this variant
of Darwall’s example.
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1. If you want to hurt my feelings, you should make fun of the way
my ears stick out.
2. You want to hurt my feelings.
∴ Therefore, you should make fun of the way my ears stick out.
Even if you do want to hurt my feelings, you shouldn’t make fun of the
way my ears stick out, because it’s wrong to hurt my feelings. Dowell
(2011), and Lauer and Condoravdi (2014) object to the Darwall example
(and other, related examples) on the grounds that they equivocate on
different meanings of ‘should’.
Yet another type of apparent counterexample to modus ponens, dis-
cussed by D. Walton (2001), involves defeasible inferences, like the famous
Tweety Bird example from cognitive science (Brewka, 1991).
1. If Tweety is a bird, then Tweety flies.
2. Tweety is a bird.
∴ Tweety flies.
The first premise of the Tweety bird argument says that there is a defeasible
connection between being a bird and flying—one that can be overridden
by extra information, e.g., that Tweety is a penguin. Thus, the premises
are true, and the conclusion false, in the case where Tweety is a penguin.
2.2 Modus Tollens
Modus tollens is the inference form:
1. If A, then C.
2. Not C.
∴ Not A.
Modus ponens and modus tollens seem to have originated together (see
Bobzien, 2002, and Gillon, 2011), and are closely related. Both inferences
posit a three-way inconsistency between ‘if A, then C’, ‘A’ and ‘not C’.
Affirm two of these inconsistent claims, and you’ll have to deny the third.
Yalcin (2012a) presents a putative counterexample to modus tollens.
Consider an urn that contains 100 marbles—some red, some blue, some
big, and some small—in the following proportions.
blue red
big 10 30
small 50 10
A marble is chosen at random and placed under a cup; no other informa-
tion about the situation is available.
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In Yalcin’s scenario, it is reasonable to accept the premises, but not the
conclusion, of this instance of modus tollens.
1. If the marble is big then it’s likely red.
2. The marble is not likely red.
∴ The marble is not big.
2.3 Conditional Proof
Conditional proof (sometimes called the deduction theorem in formal logic)
lets us establish conditional conclusions without relying on any conditional
assumptions. Suppose that an argument from the premises X and A to
the conclusion C is valid. Then conditional proof lets us conclude that the
argument from X to ‘if A, then C’ is valid. (Unlike modus ponens and
modus tollens, which let us reason from the truth of some propositions to
the truth of another proposition, conditional proof lets us reason from the
validity of one argument to the validity of another.)
Stalnaker (1975) gives an argument that can easily be worked into a
counterexample to conditional proof (though he does not present it that
way). The following argument is valid, since in classical logic, anything
follows from a contradiction:
1. The butler did it.
2. The butler didn’t do it.
∴ The gardener did it.
But the following argument is not valid:
1. The butler did it.
∴ If the butler didn’t do it, then the gardener did it.
Although conditional proof in its full generality looks implausible, a
restricted version is more appealing: if A all by itself entails C, then ‘if A,
then C’ is a truth of logic. (Koons (2014) makes a similar suggestion about
conditional proof in nonmonotonic logic.)
2.4 Transitivity, Contraposition, and Strengthening the Antecedent
Transitivity is the inference form:
1. If A, then B.
2. If B, then C.
∴ If A, then C.
Contraposition is:
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1. If A, then C.
∴ If not C, then not A.
And strengthening the antecedent is:
1. If A, then C.
∴ If A and B, then C.
All three inference forms seem to fail for ordinary conditionals in En-
glish. For transitivity, we have the following counterexample (Stalnaker,
1968, p. 106):
1. If J. Edgar Hoover had been born a Russian, then he would have
been a communist.
2. If J. Edgar Hoover had been a communist, then he would have
been a traitor.
∴ If J. Edgar Hoover had been born a Russian, then he would have
been a traitor.
For contraposition, we have the following counterexample (adapted from
Adams, 1988):
1. If it rains, then it does not rain hard.
∴ If it rains hard, then it does not rain.
And for strengthening the antecedent, we have the following counterex-
ample (Stalnaker, 1968, p. 106):
1. If this match were struck, then it would light.
∴ Therefore, if this match had been soaked in water overnight and it
were struck, then it would light.
Not everyone accepts these putative counterexamples as genuine. Bro-
gaard and Salerno (2008) argue that the meaning of a conditional depends
partly on a contextually determined set of relevant possible worlds. They
claim that the putative counterexamples involve a context shift between
the premises and the conclusion, but in any fixed context, the arguments
are valid.
Von Fintel (2001), Gillies (2007), and Williams (2008) cite linguistic evi-
dence in support of the context shift hypotheses: changing the order of
the premises and conclusions in the counterexample arguments changes
whether they seem true or false. Counterexamples to antecedent strength-
ening are closely related to so-called Sobel sequences (named for Sobel 1970).
A Sobel sequence consists of two sentences of the following form (Gillies,
2007).
(a) If Sophie had gone to the New York Mets Parade, she would have
seen Pedro Martínez.
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(b) But if Sophie had gone to the New York Mets Parade and gotten
stuck behind a tall person, she would not have seen Pedro Martínez.
It seems perfectly reasonable to assert (a) followed by (b). But once some-
one has asserted (b), an assertion of (a) seems inappropriate—after all, if
Sophie had gone to the parade, who’s to say she would not have gotten
stuck behind a tall person?
Fintel, Gillies, and Williams claim that Sobel sequences involve a context
shift: once someone asserts (b), the context changes to make (a) false, but
(a) and (b) are never true in the same context. Moss (2012) proposes an
alternative explanation: once (b) has been asserted, (a) might be true, but
is no longer known, since asserting (b) changes the standards a belief must
meet in order to count as knowledge.
2.5 Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents
Simplification of disjunctive antecedents (‘simplification’ for short; Nute,
1975) is the argument form:
1. If A or B, then C.
∴ If A, then C.
Simplification seems appealing on its face: surely, to say that the bus will
be late if it rains or snows is to say that the bus will be late if it rains, and
the bus will be late if it snows.
However, one can easily generate counterexamples by substituting the
same sentence for B and C. Suppose I have enough money to visit either
Disneyland or Graceland, but not enough to visit both. Then the premise
of the following argument is true, while its conclusion is false.
1. If I visit Disneyland or I visit Graceland, then I’ll visit Graceland.
∴ If I visit Disneyland, then I’ll visit Graceland.
Counterexamples to strengthening the antecedent can be used to gener-
ate counterexamples to simplification (Fine, 1975). Suppose we have both
of the following:
1. If A, then C.
2. Not: if A and B, then C.
A is logically equivalent to [(A and B) or (A and not B)], so by 1, we have:
3. If [(A and B) or (A and not B)], then C.
But by simplification, the truth of 3 would have to entail the falsity of 2.
So there is a three-way tension between the validity of simplification,
the invalidity of strengthening the antecedent, and the substitution of
550 r . a . briggs
logical equivalents. All three ways out of the puzzle are represented
in the literature: Loewer (1976) and Mckay and Inwagen (1977) reject
simplification; defenders of strict conditional accounts (Section 4.1) accept
strengthening the antecedent; and Nute (1975) and Alonso-Ovalle (2009)
reject substitution.
3 the indicative/counterfactual distinction
Conditionals in English can be divided into two categories, exemplified by
the following pair of sentences (Adams, 1970):
(DD). If Oswald did not shoot Kennedy, then someone else did.
(HW). If Oswald had not shot Kennedy, then someone else would have.
Although (dd) and (hw) are built up from the same antecedent and
consequent, they mean different things. (dd) would be acceptable to most
people familiar with US history: Kennedy was shot, so someone must have
shot him—if not Oswald, then someone else. But (hw) is more contro-
versial; it is accepted by conspiracy theorists, but rejected by those who
believe that Oswald acted alone. Sentences like (dd) are called indicative;
sentences like (hw) are called counterfactual (or sometimes subjunctive).
It’s not clear how to classify conditionals whose antecedents concern
the future. Consider the following sentence, as uttered by a conspirator
before the Kennedy assassination.
(DW). If Oswald does not shoot Kennedy, then someone else will.
Dudman (1983, 1984) and Bennett (1988) argue that future-tensed condi-
tionals like (dw) belong with counterfactuals like (hw); Bennett (2003,
2001; yes the same Bennett!) argues that they belong with indicatives
like (dd); Edgington (1995) argues that there exist distinct categories of
future-tensed indicatives and future-tensed counterfactuals.
Philosophers also disagree about the precise relationship between indica-
tives and counterfactuals. Some favor what Bennett (2003) calls ‘Y-shaped
analyses’, which first explain what is common to indicatives and counter-
factuals, and then bifurcate to explain how this common core can produce
two different kinds of conditionals. Others (notably Gibbard, 1981, and
Bennett, 2003) argue that we need completely separate theories of in-
dicatives and counterfactuals—that there is no interesting core shared by
both.
In what follows, I will write ‘A  C’ to indicate a counterfactual
conditional; ‘A → C’ to abbreviate an indicative conditional; and ‘if A,
then C’ where I wish to remain neutral. I turn now to a popular class of
theories, typically aimed at explaining counterfactual conditionals, but
sometimes extended to cover indicatives.
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4 selection functions
One way to give a theory of conditionals is to spell out their truth conditions,
i.e., the circumstances under which they are true. Formally, philosophers
represent the truth conditions of a sentence as a function from possible
worlds (i.e., ways the world might be) to truth values. Fully specifying
the truth conditions for every conditional would be too tall an order: to
understand the truth conditions for ‘if ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,
then snakes develop vestigial legs’, we would have to understand the truth
conditions of ‘ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny’ and ‘snakes develop ves-
tigial legs’, and that job falls outside the scope of a theory of conditionals.
So theories of conditionals adopt a more modest aim: to give a recipe for
deriving the truth conditions for ‘if A, then C’ from the truth conditions
of (arbitrary) A and C.
The concept of a selection function (Stalnaker, 1968) provides a way of
assigning truth conditions to a conditional based on the truth conditions
of its antecedent and consequent. The basic idea is that, to evaluate ‘if A,
then C’, we should first consider a set of selected possible worlds where A
is true. (Henceforth, I will use ‘A-worlds’ as shorthand for ‘worlds where
A is true’.) Intuitively, the selected worlds represent ways the actual world
might be if A were true. We then check whether, at all the selected worlds,
C is true. If so, then the counterfactual conditional ‘if A, then C’ is true at
the actual world; otherwise, it is false at the actual world.
More formally, we can model this process in terms of a selection function
f that maps ordered pairs consisting of a possible world and a proposition
onto sets of possible worlds. ‘If A, then C’ is true at a possible world
w if and only if C is true at every world in f (A, w). Different ways of
interpreting the selection function yield different theories of conditionals.
4.1 Strict Conditionals
One natural way to interpret the selection function is to check all possible
A-worlds, and say that ‘if A, then C’ is true at world w just in case C is
true at all of them. (Since what is possible may depend on what is actual,
the truth value of the conditional may vary from world to world.) This
approach yields the strict conditional interpretation of the selection function,
first developed by C. Lewis (1918). The strict conditional approach classifies
transitivity, contraposition, and antecedent-strengthening as valid—which
its opponents claim is a mistake (see D. Lewis, 1973a, pp. 4–12).
The strict conditional interpretation also gives questionable results about
which counterfactuals are true. If I were to leap out of the second-story
window of my office, I would hurt myself—but the strict conditional
account says this is not so. There are possible worlds where I leap out the
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second-story window and remain unharmed: some where there is a safety
net underneath the window, some where I am thoroughly ensconced
in protective bubble wrap, some where my body is much less fragile
than ordinary human bodies, some where the Earth’s gravitational field
is weak. . . but none of them is the sort of world that would result, if
I were to leap out the second-story window. Hájek (manuscript) sums
up the problem this way: on the strict conditional interpretation, most
counterfactuals are false.2
4.2 Closest Worlds
An alternative to the strict conditional approach, typically used for coun-
terfactuals, defines the selection function in terms of similarity among
possible worlds. For every world w, we can rank worlds from most similar
to w (‘closest’) to least similar (‘farthest away’). D. Lewis (1973a) holds that
every such ranking is a total preorder: two worlds can be equally similar to
w, but they must be comparable, so that either they are equally similar or
one is more similar than the other. (Stalnaker, 1968, discusses the special
case of the logic where no two worlds are equally close to a given world;
Pollock, 1976, discusses a generalization where worlds may be incompara-
ble in terms of closeness.) A C is true at w just in case C is true at all
the A-worlds that are most similar to w.
Formally, the closest-worlds interpretation can be modeled using a
system of ‘spheres’—sets of worlds such that every world in the set is
closer to w than every world outside it (D. Lewis, 1973a). Then f (A, w) is
the intersection of the set of A-worlds with the smallest sphere containing
at least one A-world.3
Unlike the strict conditional interpretation, the closest-worlds interpreta-
tion of the selection function can explain why transitivity, contraposition,
and antecedent-strengthening seem invalid. On the closest-worlds inter-
pretation, they are invalid, and we can use diagrams (adapted from D.
Lewis, 1973a) to illustrate why.
To see why transitivity is invalid, consider a system of spheres model
centered on a particular world w, depicted in Figure 1a. (Worlds are points
in the diagram, and spheres are concentric circles.) The A-worlds are
the points inside the shape labeled A, the B-worlds are the points inside
2 Hájek argues that the problem extends beyond strict conditional accounts; it also affects
the closest-worlds account in Section 4.2. K. S. Lewis (2015) argues that we can save the
closest-worlds account by ignoring worlds that are deemed irrelevant by a contextually-
determined standard of relevance.
3 Some technical difficulties arise when there is no smallest sphere containing at least
one A-world, but only a limitless sequence of ever-smaller spheres; see D. Lewis (1973b,
pp. 424–425); Stalnaker (1981, pp. 96–99); Warmbrod (1982); and Díez (2015) for discussion.
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the shape labeled B, and the C-worlds are the points inside the shape
labeled C. All the closest A-worlds to w are B-worlds, and all the closest
B-worlds are C-worlds; yet none of the closest A-worlds are C-worlds.
Figure 1b shows a counterexample to contraposition, and Figure 1c shows
a counterexample to antecedent strengthening.
Defenders of the closest-worlds theory have the burden of spelling out
what ‘closeness’ amounts to. D. Lewis (1973a) claims that closeness is
based on similarity among worlds: to say that one world is closer to w
than another is to say that the first world is more similar to w than the
second. But Fine (1975) presents an example where greater similarity does
not make for greater closeness. (I have taken a few liberties with the details
of the example.)
On September 26, 1983, at the height of the Cold War, a Soviet early-
warning system went off, falsely reporting that missiles had been launched
at Russia from the US (Aksenov, 2013). The officer who saw the alarm,
Stanislav Petrov, did not report it to his superiors, and so Russia did not
launch missiles in retaliation. The following conditional seems true:
PETROV. If Petrov had informed his superiors at the time of the false
alarm, then there would have been a nuclear war.
After all, Petrov’s superiors were poised to launch the missiles in the event
of an attack, and it seems that the phone lines and missile system were in
working order. The only missing ingredient was the report from Petrov.
But among the worlds where Petrov informs his superiors at the time
of the false alarm, those where the Soviet missile launch is prevented
by a happy accident—incompetence by Petrov’s superiors, or a broken
telephone, or a malfunction of the Soviet missile system—are more similar
to the actual world than those where the launch goes through. Worlds
where the missile launch is prevented by a happy accident agree with the
actual world about the total number of nuclear wars in the 20th Century—
surely a more important dimension of similarity than the functioning or
malfunctioning of one measly telephone line.4
4.3 Past Predominance
To handle the petrov example, a natural thought goes, we need an account
of the selection function that treats the past differently from the future.
When Petrov made his choice, the missile launch system was already in
4 Defenders of the closest-worlds interpretation reply that we should understand ‘similarity’
so that agreeing about the total number of nuclear wars in the 20th Century does not make
for greater similarity than agreeing about the functioning or malfunctioning of one measly
telephone line; see D. Lewis (1979) and Arregui (2009).
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w
A
BC
(a) Transitivity
w
A
B
(b) Contraposition
w
B
AC
(c) Strengthening the antecedent
Figure 1: Counterexamples to transitivity, contraposition, and strengthening the
antecedent in the closest-worlds framework
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t1
t3 t6 t9
t2
t5 t8
t4 t7
Figure 2: A model of branching time
working order—but it was not yet determined whether there would be a
war.
Thomason and Gupta (1980) propose an account of the selection function
that takes seriously the past-future asymmetry. They model the universe
using branching time, where each moment has only one possible past,
but multiple possible futures. (Cross, 1990, shows that the assumption of
branching time is dispensable; past predominance can also be modeled
using ordinary possible worlds.) Figure 2 depicts such a model. The
nodes t1, t2, . . . , t9 are moments. Paths through the tree—in this example,
{t1, t2, t4, t7}, {t1, t2, t5, t8}, and {t1, t3, t6, t9}—are called histories.
We can think of each possible world as containing information about
which moment is present, as well as information about which history is
actual. (On this way of understanding the model, even when the present
moment has more than one possible future, there is a fact of the matter
about which future will occur.)
Thomason and Gupta adopt a past predominance principle, which says
that if a world is in f (A, w), then it must diverge from w as late as
possible—there can be no other A-world whose history overlaps w for a
longer span than f (A, w).5
The past predominance view can explain the petrov example. Con-
sider the following interpretation of our diagram: the actual history is
{t1, t2, t4, t7}. At t1, it is not yet settled whether the early warning system
goes off. The early warning system goes off t2, and Petrov must decide
what to do. (At t3, which belongs to an alternative history, there is never
any alarm.) At t4, Petrov decides not to notify his superiors, and so at
t7, there is no nuclear war. (At t5, which belongs to another alternative
history, Petrov decides to notify his superiors, and a nuclear war ensues at
t8.)
Now consider the conditional petrov, as uttered at t7. Its antecedent is
false at the actual world, which has the history {t1, t2, t4, t7}. The closest
5 For technical reasons, Thomason and Gupta also assume that f (A, w) is a singleton set,
and posit that each world contains a choice function, which specifies not just what the future
will be like, but what the future would have been like had the past gone differently. I pass
over the details.
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worlds where its antecedent is true must have the history {t1, t2, t5, t8},
which diverges from the actual world’s history at the last possible moment
yet still makes the antecedent true. Since the actual present moment is t7,
it seems reasonable to select t8 as the present moment at all the closest
worlds. Since there is a nuclear war at t8, the consequent of petrov is true
at all the the closest worlds; hence petrov is true at the actual world.
4.4 Causal Models
A class of examples called Morgenbesser cases (Slote, 1978, 27n) suggest that
the selection function should respect causal as well as temporal constraints.
Edgington (2004) gives a representative Morgenbesser case.
Our heroine misses a flight to Paris due to a car breakdown. She com-
plains to the repairman: ‘If I had caught the plane, I would have been
halfway to Paris by now!’ But he corrects her: ‘I was listening to the radio.
It crashed. If you had caught that plane, you would be dead by now.’
The repairman claims that the following counterfactual is true.
LETHAL. If the heroine had caught that plane, she would be dead by
now.
He is right. It’s not clear that past predominance can explain why he’s
right: the plane crash occurs after our heroine would have made her
flight.6 What matters is that the plane crash is causally independent of
whether she makes her flight. This is why, when assessing what would
have happened if our heroine had made her flight, we should hold the
plane crash fixed.
Pearl (2009) proposes a causal theory of counterfactuals that accounts
for Morgenbesser cases. His theory relies on the concept of a causal model,
consisting of a set of variables, which represent what circumscribed parts
of the world are like, and a set of structural equations, which represent
direct causal links between variables. Each variable is assigned an actual
value; we can think of variables as questions about parts of the world, their
possible values as possible answers to those questions, and their actual
values as the correct answers in the actual world. Note that although I
introduced selection semantics as a recipe for assigning truth values to
conditionals at worlds, Pearl’s theory is a recipe for assigning truth values
to conditionals at model-valuation pairs.7
6 But see Phillips (2007) for an argument that past predominance can provide an adequate
explanation.
7 Pearl’s theory can be understood as a version of the situation semantics defended by
Barwise and Perry (1981). Instead of assigning truth values to propositions at worlds, it
assigns truth values to propositions at situations, which represent ways that circumscribed
parts of the world could be.
conditionals 557
We can understand Pearl’s theory by first building a causal model of
Edgington’s plane example, then using the model to evaluate the condi-
tional lethal. The model will include the following variables.
car =
1 if the car is working,0 otherwise.
catch =
1 if our heroine catches her plane,0 otherwise.
crash =
1 if there is a crash,0 otherwise.
location =

0 if our heroine ends up stuck at the side of the road,
1 if our heroine ends up in Paris,
2 if our heroine ends up dead.
car and crash are what Pearl calls exogenous variables; their values are
determined by factors outside the model. catch and location are endoge-
nous variables; their values are determined by the values of other variables
in the model.
For each of the endogenous variables, the model specifies a structural
equation. In the plane example, the structural equations are as follows.
catch = car
location =

0 if catch = 0,
1 if catch = 1 and crash = 0,
2 if catch = 1 and crash = 1.
(NB: the structural equations are asymmetric. The variable on the left-hand
side has its value causally determined by the variables on the right-hand
side.)
In the plane example, the variables take on the following values.
car = 0,
catch = 0,
crash = 1,
location = 0.
We can summarize information about the variables and structural equa-
tions using the causal graph in Figure 3a. An arrow from one variable to
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car catch
crash location
(a) The actual model
car catch
crash location
(b) The submodel generated by intervening to make the antecedent true
Figure 3: Causal graph used to evaluate the counterfactual lethal: ‘If the heroine
had caught that plane, she would be dead by now’.
another indicates that the first variable exerts direct causal influence on
the second, but unlike the structural equations, the causal graph doesn’t
specify the nature of that influence.
Given a pair consisting of a model and an assignment of values to
variables in the model, we can use a selection function to assign truth
values to conditionals. (This time, the selection function takes in a model,
and returns a singleton containing one new model.) Pearl’s account is
restricted to counterfactuals whose antecedents are either ‘literals’, which
say that a particular variable takes on a particular value, or conjunctions
of literals. (So ‘the heroine’s car breaks down and the plane crashes’ is an
acceptable antecedent, while ‘the heroine’s car breaks down or the plane
crashes’ is not.)
Where 〈M, V〉 is a model paired with an assignment of values to vari-
ables, and A is an antecedent with the appropriate form, we can generate a
submodel 〈MA, VA〉 by ‘intervening’ on 〈M, V〉 to make A true. Intuitively,
we can imagine an intervention as an action by someone outside the model
who ‘reaches in’ to make the antecedent true, without tinkering with
variables that are causally independent of the antecedent. For instance,
a cabbie could intervene to set catch = 1 by driving our heroine to the
airport regardless of whether or not her car has broken down.
Formally, the submodel MA is a model with the same variables as M,
but different structural equations. If X is one of the variables mentioned in
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A, and X is endogenous, we delete the structural equation corresponding
to X, and make X exogenous instead. (This corresponds to the idea that an
intervention makes A true regardless of whether its typical causes obtain;
the intervening cabbie enables the heroine to get to the airport whether
or not her car is in working order.) We then set the value VA of each
X mentioned in A to the value specified by A. (This corresponds to the
idea that the intervention makes the antecedent true.) If a variable is not
causally influenced (either directly or indirectly) by any of the variables
mentioned in the antecedent, then VA assigns it the same value as V. (This
corresponds to the idea that an intervention is minimal, so that only the
variables mentioned in the antecedent are directly affected.) Finally, if a
variable is causally influenced by one of the variables mentioned in the
antecedent, then its value VA is fixed by the structural equations. (This
corresponds to the idea that an intervention is minimal in another sense: it
does not interfere with the downstream effects of the variables mentioned
in the antecedent.)
We are now ready to evaluate the counterfactual
LETHAL. If the heroine had caught that plane, she would be dead by
now.
in our original model. To check whether lethal is true in the original
model, we intervene to make its antecedent true—i.e., to set catch = 1.
We then check whether the consequent is true (i.e., location = 2) in the
resulting submodel.
First, we delete the structural equation for catch, turning catch into
an exogenous variable. Our only remaining structural equation is
location =

0 if catch = 0,
1 if catch = 1 and crash = 0,
2 if catch = 1 and crash = 1.
(The graph for the resulting submodel is shown in Figure 3b.)
Second, we set the values of the variables. The antecedent requires that
catch = 1.
Since neither car nor crash is downstream from catch, we have
car = 0,
crash = 1.
Finally, the value of location is fixed by the structural equation. Since
catch = 1 and crash = 1, we have
location = 2.
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Therefore, in the submodel, the protagonist is dead, so in the original
model, had she caught her plane, she would have been dead.
The procedure described is a type of selection semantics: given an
antecedent and a model-valuation pair, we call on a ‘submodel’ selection
function that returns the singleton set of another model-valuation pair
(a submodel). Galles and Pearl (1998) argue that this selection semantics
is formally equivalent to the closest-worlds account. However, there is
a key difference between the two accounts: the selection semantics lets
us assigns truth conditions to counterfactuals built up from arbitrary
sentences, while the causal modeling account only lets us assign truth
values to counterfactuals whose antecedents are literals, or conjunctions
of literals. Schulz (2011) and Briggs (2012) propose ways of extending
the language to counterfactuals with logically complex antecedents; their
proposed theories are logically inequivalent to the closest-worlds semantics.
Huber (2013) proposes an alternative way of extending the language that
makes it logically equivalent to the closest-worlds account.
5 counterpossible conditionals
Selection semantics has trouble with counterpossible conditionals—that is,
conditionals whose antecedents are impossible. It counts all counterpos-
sible conditionals as trivially true. Where A is impossible, there are no
possible A-worlds. Therefore, if we feed the selection function an impos-
sibility A and a world w and ask it to return a set of possible A-worlds,
it returns the empty set. Trivially, all the A-worlds in the empty set are
C-worlds, so that trivially A C is true in the original world.
But counterpossibles seem to have non-trivial truth conditions: some
are true, while others are false. Examples of true counterpossibles include:
If Hobbes had (secretly) squared the circle, sick children in the
mountains of South America at the time would not have cared
(Nolan, 1997, p. 544).
If I were a horse, then I would have hooves (Krakauer, 2012, p. 10).
If wishes were horses, beggars would ride (Krakauer, 2012, p. 10).
If intuitionistic logic were the correct logic, then the law of excluded
middle would no longer be unrestrictedly valid (adapted from Bro-
gaard & Salerno, 2013).
Corresponding examples of false counterpossibles include:
If Hobbes had (secretly) squared the circle, sick children in the
mountains of South America at the time would have taken notice.
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If I were a horse, then I would have scales.
If wishes were horses, no one would own any horses.
If intuitionistic logic were the correct logic, then the law of excluded
middle would still be unrestrictedly valid.
Assigning non-trivial truth values to counterpossibles doesn’t just cap-
ture linguistic intuitions; it also enables counterpossibles to do valuable
philosophical work. Non-trivial counterpossibles help us assess rival philo-
sophical, mathematical, and logical theories by telling us what would
follow if those theories were true (Krakauer, 2012; Brogaard & Salerno,
2013; Nolan, 1997). They explain how necessary events and omissions of
impossible events are causally relevant to the actual world—how a mathe-
matician’s failure to disprove Fermat’s Last Theorem prevented her from
getting tenure, how my failure to be in two places at once caused me to
miss a colloquium talk, or how the copresence of a mental property and its
subvening physical property can result in a subject’s raising his arm (Bern-
stein, 2016). They can be used to give an account of essences: an essential
property is one such that, if the bearer had lacked it, then the bearer would
not have existed (Brogaard & Salerno, 2013, 2007). (Non-trivial counterpos-
sibles save this account from certain implausible commitments—e.g., that
living in a world where 2+ 2 = 4 is trivially part of everyone’s essence.)
Not everybody agrees that counterpossibles have non-trivial truth values,
however. Williamson (2007, p. 172) argues that apparent examples of non-
trivial counterpossibles collapse under closer scrutiny. In a slight variant
on Williamson’s example,8 imagine that a student is mulling over a graded
arithmetic test. Of the 12 problems on the test, the student has gotten
the last one wrong: ‘what is 5 + 7?’ The student, who answered ‘11’,
laments: ‘If only 5+ 7 were 11, I would have gotten a perfect score!’ This
seems to be true, and furthermore, it seems false that if 5+ 7 were 11, the
student would have gotten one of the problems wrong. But appearances
are deceptive. Suppose that 5 + 7 were 11. Then in answering all the
problems right, the student would have given five right answers followed
by seven more right answers, for a total of 11 right answers. Since there
are 12 problems on the test, the student would have gotten one problem
wrong after all. (For a rebuttal of Williamson’s argument, see Salerno and
Brogaard, 2007.)
5.1 Impossible Worlds
Nolan (1997) gives an account of counterpossibles by supplementing the
closest-worlds account with impossible worlds—ways the world couldn’t
8 Thanks to Sharon Berry for suggesting this version in conversation.
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be. We can then say that A B is true at w just in case B is true at all
the closest possible or impossible A-worlds to w. Two questions then arise:
what are impossible worlds, and what makes them closer to or further
away from the actual world?
The ontology of impossible worlds has spawned its own literature: they
may be collections of individuals like our actual world (Yagisawa, 2010),
or they may be sets of sentences in some suitable language (Hintikka,
1975; Melia, 2001; Sider, 2002; see Berto, 2013, for a general overview and
discussion.) Another pressing question for theorists of counterpossibles
concerns the logical structure of impossible worlds. Is it the case that for
every set of sentences, there is some impossible world where all and only
the sentences in the set are true? Or is there more logical structure we can
impose on impossible worlds?
Proponents of impossible worlds typically don’t require that the im-
possible worlds be closed under classical logical consequence—in other
words, they don’t require that whenever some propositions are true at an
impossible world, all the classical logical consequences of those propo-
sitions are true at the world too. If impossible worlds had to be closed
under classical logical consequence, then whenever A was impossible by
the rules of classical logic, A C would be trivially true. Nolan (1997,
p. 547) argues that we should not require impossible worlds to be closed
under any kind of logical consequence, since for every putative logical
truth, there are non-trivial facts about what the world would be like if
that logical truth did not obtain. A similar line of reasoning suggests that
some impossible worlds have truth-value gluts: we can speculate about
what would happen if there were true contradictions, so there must be
impossible worlds at which there are true contradictions.
Bjerring (2013) argues that some impossible worlds have truth-value
gaps. Otherwise, he argues, our theory of counterpossibles would misclas-
sify certain conditionals as true, such as this one: ‘If intuitionistic logic
were correct, then the Law of Excluded Middle would hold.’ (The Law of
Excluded Middle says of every proposition that either it or its negation
holds; intuitionists famously deny it.)
What about closeness? Nolan (1997) proposes the
Strangeness of Impossibility Condition. Any possible world is more
similar [closer] to the actual world than any impossible world (Nolan,
1997, p. 550).
The Strangeness of Impossibility Condition ensures that where A is a
possible proposition, supplementing the closest-worlds account with im-
possible worlds has no effect on how we evaluate A C. So long as A
is possible, the set of closest possible A-worlds coincides with the set of
closest possible or impossible A-worlds.
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Bjerring (2013, p. 348) proposes another constraint on closeness, which
implicitly relativizes closeness to the antecedent of a counterfactual. Given
a collection of logical systems L1, L2, . . . , Ln, where L1 is classical logic, and
where WLi is the set of worlds deductively closed under Li’s entailment
relation, Bjerring endorses the
Relative Closeness Condition. For any counterfactual whose antece-
dent presupposes that some logic Li is correct (true, adequate), a
world in modal space WLi is closer to the actual world than any
world in modal space WLj , where WLi 6= WLj , and where i ≥ 1 and
j > 1.9
Brogaard and Salerno (2013) develop a theory on which impossible
worlds are close to the actual world to the extent that they
1. minimize discrepancies with relevant background facts about the
actual world (where the relevance of background facts is fixed by
context), and
2. minimize violations of relevant a priori entailment (where relevant a
priori entailment is spelled out in more detail in the paper).
As an illustration of these conditions, Brogaard and Salerno use them to
evaluate the counterpossible conditional ‘if water had not been H2O, then
water would have been a monkey’. This counterpossible is false. Their
theory delivers the correct verdict, they claim, because it is a priori that
water is not a monkey.
To derive this verdict, they consider two impossible worlds where the an-
tecedent is true. At w1, water is some chemical compound XYZ (different
from H2O), while at w2, water is a monkey.
w1 w2
water is not H2O water is not H2O
water is XYZ water is a monkey
Since there are more a priori truths that hold at w1 than at w2, and since
both agree with the actual world about the same number of propositions,
w1 is closer to the actual world than w2. (Brogaard and Salerno tacitly
assume that there are no antecedent worlds closer to the actual world than
9 As stated by Bjerring, the Relative Closeness Condition seems to presuppose that WLi and
WLj do not intersect. We can get rid of this presupposition by modifying the condition
slightly:
Relative Closeness Condition∗. For any counterfactual whose antecedent presupposes
that some logic Li is correct (true, adequate), a world in modal space WLi is closer to
the actual world than any world outside WLi .
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w1 or w2.) Thus, at least one of the closest impossible worlds where water
is not H2O is one where water fails to be a monkey, so the conditional is
false at the actual world.
5.2 Relevant Logic
Relevant logics are motivated by the thought that the conditional ‘if A,
then C’ claims that the truth of A is connected to the truth of C. Relevant
logics originated as rivals to the material conditional account, on which
the conditional ‘if A, then C’ is true just in case A is false or C is true (see
Section 6). However, some of the same intuitions that favor relevant logics
over the material conditional account also favor them over the closest-
worlds account. After all, the reason it seems wrong to say ‘if Hobbes had
squared the circle, sick children in the mountains of South America would
have cared’ is that there is no connection between Hobbes’s squaring the
circle and the interests of sick South American children. Likewise, the
reason it seems right to say ‘if I were a horse, I would have hooves’ is
because something’s being a horse is connected to its having hooves.
Relevant logics are often characterized in proof-theoretic terms. But
Routley and Meyer (1973, 1972a, 1972b) develop a versatile semantics for
the conditionals of relevant logics, which generalizes the strict conditional
semantics of Section 4.1. Recall that on the strict conditional interpretation,
A C is true at w just in case C is true at all possible A-worlds (relative
to w). We can rewrite the selection function in terms of a two-place ac-
cessibility relation among worlds: we say that Rwx just in case world x is
possible according to world w, and that f (A, w) is the set of all A-worlds
x such that Rwx.
Routley and Meyer interpret the conditional in terms of a three-place
accessibility relation among worlds. ‘If A, then C’ is true at w just in case,
for all worlds x and y such that Rwxy and x is an A world, C is true at y.
Different restrictions on relation R generate different relevant logics. (For
some logics, we need impossible worlds where both a sentence and its
negation fail to be true, or impossible worlds where both sentence and its
negation are true.)
This three-place R relation is formally useful, but does it mean anything?
Beall et al. (2012) propose three interpretations of Rwxy, which spring
from different ways of grouping w, x, and y.10 All three interpretations
can be illustrated with the conditional
THERMITE. If you light a bucket of thermite with a titanium fuse, then a
huge explosion will ensue.
10 For a discussion of other ways of interpreting the ternary relation, with references, see
Jago (2013).
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grouping the second and third worlds together : Rw〈xy〉 .
‘If A, then C’ says at the actual world w, there are no counterexamples
where A is true and C is false. We typically think of counterexamples as
involving a single world which makes some things true and other things
false, but relevant logicians split the labor between two worlds x and y, so
that whatever holds at x is true, while whatever fails to hold at y is false.
In the example of thermite, we might think of potential counterexamples
as divided into an earlier part x, when a bucket of thermite may or may
not be lit with a titanium fuse, and a later part y, when there may or may
not be an explosion. If the actual world w admits some possible two-part
scenarios that begin with the lighting of thermite with a titanium fuse, but
fails to end in a huge explosion, then these scenarios are counterexamples
that falsify thermite.
grouping the first and second worlds together : R〈wx〉y .
‘If A, then C’ says that using one’s current information to draw inferences
from A will yield the information that C. To say that Rwxy is to say that
when the rules of w are applied to the information in x, it is possible to
infer y (or some information that entails y). In the case of thermite, we
can imagine w as a parcel of information specifying the actual laws of
nature, and x as another parcel of information specifying that a bucket
of thermite has been lit with a titanium fuse. If sticking these parcels of
information together licenses the conclusion that there has been a huge
explosion (and does so no matter how we fill in x, the information that
the thermite has been lit), then the conditional thermite is true.
grouping the first and third worlds together : Rw〉x〈y . ‘If
A, then C’ says that C is necessary relative to A, or that C is necessary
in an A-ish way. The conditional thermite does not say it is absolutely
necessary that a huge explosion will ensue. The world w may permit a
possible scenario y in which no huge explosions occur. However, once we
enrich w with some additional information x, specifying that a bucket of
thermite has been lit with a titanium fuse, we can consider what is possible
under that supposition. If there is some way of filling in the antecedent
that makes y a possibility, then y is possible not just absolutely, but under
the supposition that the antecedent of thermite is true.
Mares and Fuhrmann (1995) propose a theory of counterfactuals that
combines the closest-worlds interpretation of the selection function with
the relevant interpretation of the conditional: A B is true at a world w
just in case the relevant conditional ‘if A, then B’ is true at all closest A-
worlds to w. Mares (1994) argues that this theory has useful applications to
conditional analyses of causation, and to theories of conditional obligation.
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6 the material conditional account of indicatives
According to the material conditional account defended by Grice (1989)
and Jackson (1987), an indicative conditional A → C is true just in case
either its antecedent A is true, or its consequent C is false. (The material
conditional account is almost always offered as a theory of indicative condi-
tionals alone, since counterfactual conditionals with false antecedents can
be false. Even though I don’t keep a horse, it is false that if I were to keep a
horse, it would breathe fire.) The material conditional account has a simple
explanation for the apparent validity of all the the inferences discussed in
Section 2 (modus ponens, modus tollens, conditional proof, strengthen-
ing the antecedent, transitivity, contraposition, and simplification): these
inferences really are valid.
Furthermore, there are persuasive arguments for the conclusion that
an indicative conditional A→ C is true if and only if the corresponding
material conditional ‘not A or C’ is true. Suppose the indicative conditional
is true. Then it can’t have a true antecedent and a false consequent; that
would be a violation of modus ponens. So the indicative conditional
entails the material conditional. But when I know that either C holds or A
doesn’t, I can infer that if A, then C. So the material conditional entails the
indicative. (Stalnaker, 1975, p. 136, calls this the direct argument.) Since
the material and indicative conditionals entail each other, they must be
equivalent.
Gibbard (1981) provides a formal argument for the equivalence of the
indicative and material conditionals based on three logical principles.
Where ‘not A’ is abbreviated ¬A and ‘A or B’ is abbreviated A ∨ B, the
principles are:
Pseudo Modus Ponens. A→ C entails ¬A ∨ C.
Import-Export. A→ (B→ C) is equivalent to (A ∧ B)→ C.
Conditional Proof. If A entails C, then A→ C is a logical truth.
To show that A → C and ¬A ∨ C are equivalent, Gibbard only needs to
show that each entails the other. By Pseudo Modus Ponens, A→ C entails
¬A ∨ C. The proof that ¬A ∨ C entails A→ C is as follows.
1. ((¬A ∨ C) ∧ A) entails C. (By tautological reasoning.)
2. It is a truth of logic that ((¬A ∨ C) ∧ A)→ C. (By 1 and Conditional
Proof.)
3. It is a truth of logic that (¬A ∨ C) → (A → C). (By 2 and Import-
Export.)
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4. It is a truth of logic that ¬(¬A ∨ C) ∨ (A → C). (By 3 and Pseudo
Modus Ponens.)
5. (¬A ∨ C) entails (A→ C). (By 4 and tautological reasoning.)
Despite these points in its favor, the material conditional account faces
substantial difficulties. It seems to yield wrong predictions about logical
validity, often called ‘paradoxes of material implication’.
For example,the material conditional account entails that all of the
following are truths of logic:
Either the unburied dead will walk the Earth if I bury a chicken head
in my backyard, or the unburied dead will walk the Earth if I fail to
bury a chicken head in my backyard (McGee, 2005).
Either you are virtuous if you are rich, or you are rich if you are
virtuous.
One of these three things holds: if you grant voting rights to children,
you will grant them to guinea pigs; if you grant voting rights to
guinea pigs, you will grant them to inanimate objects; or if you grant
voting rights to inanimate objects, you will take them away from
adult human beings.
Furthermore, the material conditional account entails that all of the follow-
ing inferences are valid. (The proof of God’s existence is due to Edgington,
1986.)
1. I will not do my chores today.
∴ If I do my chores today, then the world will implode.
1. Dinner will be delicious.
∴ If I burn the veggie burgers and pour sand into the sweet potatoes,
then dinner will be delicious.
1. If God does not exist, then it’s not the case that if I pray, my prayers
will be answered.
2. I do not pray.
∴ God exists.
In addition to yielding bad predictions about validity, the material
conditional account yields bad predictions about the probabilities of con-
ditionals. Suppose I draw a card at random from a 52-card deck. The
material conditional ‘either I do not draw a red ace, or I draw the ace of
hearts’ has probability 51/52. (The only way for me to make it false is to
draw the ace of diamonds.) Therefore, by the material conditional account,
I should assign probability 51/52 to the indicative conditional ‘if I draw a
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red ace, then it will be the ace of hearts’. But the indicative conditional ‘if
I draw a red ace, then it will be the ace of hearts’ should get probability
1/2, since half the time when I draw a red ace, it will be an ace of hearts.
More generally, the material conditional account falls afoul of
The Thesis. Whenever A and C are propositions, the probability of the
indicative conditional A→ C is equal to the conditional probability
of C given A, understood as
Pr(A|C) = Pr(A ∧ C)
Pr(C)
.
the thesis is a plausible way of unpacking the so-called Ramsey test, based
on a famous remark by Ramsey (1978, 143n):
If two people are arguing ‘If p will q?’; and are both in doubt
as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of
knowledge and arguing on that basis about q; so that in a sense
‘If p, q’ and ‘If p, [not q]’ are contradictories.
Unfortunately, the material conditional account is straightforwardly in-
compatible with the thesis, and with the Ramsey test more generally. The
probability that a material conditional is true is not, in general, the condi-
tional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. (The probability
of the material conditional may be anywhere between that conditional
probability and 1.) Furthermore, where A is highly unlikely, the material
conditional ‘not A or C’ is both highly believable and highly assertible,
whether or not adding A to one’s stock of knowledge would justify a high
degree of confidence in C.
Grice (1989) and Jackson (1987) explain these wrong predictions by
distinguishing between true sentences and sentences that can appropriately
be asserted. According to Grice, in a situation where I will not do my
chores today, it is technically true that if I do my chores today, then the
world will implode. Likewise, in a situation where dinner will be delicious,
it is technically true that if I burn the veggie burgers and pour sand into the
sweet potatoes, then dinner will be delicious. Nonetheless, it is misleading
to assert a conditional when I know that its antecedent is false, or when I
know that its consequent is true, because it is misleading to assert a weak
claim when I could have asserted a stronger one. Refusing to assert the
stronger claim is liable to mislead my audience into thinking that I do
not know it. The supposedly paradoxical arguments are valid. When their
premises are true, their conclusions may be bad, but this does not make
their conclusions false.
Grice’s proposed mechanism for explaining away the problem is useful
in other domains: it can explain why some non-conditional assertions are
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misleading. For instance, if you ask where John is, and I know that he
is in the library, it is misleading for me to reply ‘He is either at the pub,
or in the library.’ A similar trick works for negated conjunctions, as an
example by D. Lewis (1976) shows. If I point out a harmless mushroom
that I plan to keep for myself, and remark ‘You won’t eat that and live’,
knowing that my assertion will prevent you from eating it, then I am guilty
of misleading you, though what I say is technically true.
Jackson (1987) is not satisfied with Grice’s explanation, since sometimes,
it is all right to assert an indicative conditional even if you know that the
antecedent is false, or the consequent is true. I know that Oswald killed
Kennedy, but can nonetheless assert that if Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy,
someone else did. Jackson has a different explanation for why technically
true conditionals might sound wrong. While the material conditional
account captures the truth conditions of an indicative conditional, the
meaning of ‘if. . . then. . . ’ goes beyond its truth conditions. Built into the
meaning of an English indicative conditional is the implication that it
would still be appropriate to assert the material conditional, even if its
antecedent were known. (Jackson calls this feature ‘robustness’.) The
Oswald-Kennedy conditional is robust, because even if I had reason to
doubt that Oswald killed Kennedy, I would still have good reasons to
believe that either Oswald or someone else killed him.
7 the no truth values (ntv) account of indicatives
Suppose you are convinced that the material conditional account gives the
wrong truth conditions for the indicative conditionals. You might hope
that there was some other account of the truth conditions for indicative
conditionals—one that could better explain the truth of the thesis. Un-
fortunately, a collection of so-called ‘triviality theorems’ suggests that no
truth conditions whatsoever will do the trick. Triviality theorems motivate
Edgington (1986, 1995) and Appiah (1985) to claim that indicative condi-
tionals lack truth values altogether. (Edgington, 2008, goes on to develop
a Y-shaped theory on which counterfactual conditionals also lack truth
values altogether.)
In general, triviality theorems show that if the thesis is true in general,
then every probability function is trivial: it assigns positive probability
to at most two mutually exclusive alternatives. But it is absurd to claim
that every probability function is trivial. (Here is a non-trivial probability
function: the one that assigns probability 1/6 to each possible outcome of
the roll of a single die.) Therefore, we must reject the thesis.
To see how triviality theorems work, we can consider an early result by
D. Lewis (1976), illustrated by system of diagrams adapted from Edgington
(1995). Edgington visualizes probabilities using rectangles, divided into
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C
¬C
A
¬A
A
¬A
Figure 4: A probability space
horizontal segments representing propositions. The height of a segment
represents the probability of the corresponding proposition; the entire
rectangle is normalized to have height 1. In Figure 4 the proposition C has
probability 1/2. C is subdivided into the propositions A ∧ C (probability
1/4) and A ∧ ¬C (probability 1/4). ¬C (also with probability 1/2) is
subdivided into the propositions ¬C ∧ A (probability 1/8) and ¬C ∧ ¬A
(probability 3/8).
Figure 5 shows how to calculate the probability of A conditional on C by
erasing the bottom half of the diagram, and stretching out the remaining
part of the rectangle so its height is 1 (in effect multiplying the height
of each of its sub-regions by 1Pr(C) ). The new height of the A region is
Pr(A|C).
According to the Law of Total Probability (illustrated in Figure 6), for
any two propositions X and Y,
Pr(Y) = Pr(Y|X)× Pr(X) + Pr(Y|¬X)× Pr(¬X). (1)
Consider any two propositions A and C such that P(A ∧ C) > 0, and
P(A ∧ ¬C) > 0. Plugging in A for X and A → C for Y in Equation 1
yields:
Pr(A→ C) = Pr(A→ C|C)× Pr(C) + Pr(A→ C|¬C)× Pr(¬C). (2)
In other words, we can split the probability space into a C part and
a ¬C part, and figure out the probability of A → C by averaging its
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Step 1: Erase the ¬C area.
C
¬C
A
¬A
A
¬A
Step 2: Stretch the C area.
C
A
¬A
Figure 5: Calculating conditional probability
probabilities conditional on each part, a procedure illustrated in Figure 7.
Consider the probability distribution PrC such that for all propositions X,
PrC(X) = Pr(X|C) (shown in the top center of Figure 7). Using the fact
that PrC(A) > 0, the fact that PrC(C) = 1, and the definition of conditional
probability, we can show that
PrC(C|A) = 1. (3)
Thus, by the thesis and Equation 3,
PrC(A→ C) = 1. (4)
By the definition of PrC and Equation 4,
Pr(A→ C|C) = 1. (5)
Likewise, when we consider the probability distribution Pr¬C such that
for all X, Pr¬C(X) = Pr(X|¬C) (shown in the bottom center of Figure 7),
we see by the fact that PrC(A) > 0, the fact that PrC(C) = 1, and the
definition of conditional probability that
Pr¬C(C|A) = 0. (6)
Thus, by the thesis, and Equation 6,
Pr¬C(A→ C) = 0. (7)
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Pr(Y)
(total height of
shaded region)
=
X
¬X
Y
¬Y
Y
¬Y
Pr(Y|X)
(height of shaded
stretched region)
Pr(X)
(stretch factor) ×
X
Y
¬Y
+
Pr(Y|¬X)
(height of shaded
stretched region)
Pr(¬X)
(stretch factor) ×
¬X
Y
¬Y
Figure 6: The Law of Total Probability
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And by the definition of Pr¬C and Equation 7,
Pr(A→ C|¬C) = 0. (8)
Using Equation 5 and Equation 8 to make the appropriate substitutions
into equation Equation 2, we get:
Pr(A→ C) = 1× Pr(C) + 0× Pr(¬C) = Pr(C). (9)
But by the thesis,
Pr(A→ C) = Pr(C|A). (10)
Substituting Pr(C|A) for Pr(A→ C) on the left-hand side of Equation 9,
we get:
Pr(C|A) = Pr(C) (11)
—in other words, A and C are probabilistically independent.
The above proof shows that Equation 11 holds for arbitrary propositions
A and C, provided both Pr(A ∧ C) and Pr(A ∧ ¬C) are both greater than
0. Therefore Equation 11 should hold for all pairs of propositions A and C
such that Pr(A ∧ C) and Pr(A ∧ ¬C) are both greater than 0. But this is
only possible in trivial probability spaces. So one of our assumptions must
have gone wrong, and the natural place to pin the blame is on the thesis.
There are various possible ways out of Lewis’s triviality theorem. The
proof assumes that the conditional A → C has a single set of truth con-
ditions, which remain stable across Pr, PrC, and Pr¬C. Defenders of the
thesis might reject this assumption and claim that the truth-conditions
of conditionals are context-dependent. The proof also assumes that the
thesis holds for all probability functions and all conditionals. Defend-
ers of the thesis might retreat and claim that it is true for only some
conditionals, or some probability functions.
Unfortunately, both escape routes are treacherous. New triviality theo-
rems can be derived from much weaker assumptions; for a helpful survey,
see Hall and Hájek (1994). There are even triviality results that use non-
probabilistic variants of the thesis (Gärdenfors, 1988), and trivializing
versions of the thesis that apply to counterfactuals rather than indica-
tives (Williams, 2012). On a slightly more optimistic note, non-triviality
results can be obtained by adopting (sufficiently weak) non-classical logics
(Morgan & Mares, 1995).
Another way out of Lewis’s triviality theorem is to reject the thesis.
Kaufmann (2004) produces examples of indicative conditionals in English
that intuitively seem to violate the thesis, and Douven and Verbrugge
(2013) provide experimental evidence that English speakers’ judgments
about indicative conditionals violate the thesis.
If probability is probability of truth, defenders of the NTV view should
reject the thesis too. However, defenders of the NTV view typically defend
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C
¬C
A
¬A
A
¬A
PrC(A→ C) = 1
C
A
¬A
PrC(C|A) = 1
C A
Pr¬C(A→ C) = 0
¬C
A
¬A
Pr¬C(C|A) = 0
¬C A
Figure 7: The Lewis triviality theorem illustrated
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versions the thesis, but adopt alternative interpretations of ‘probability’,
on which the probability of a conditional is not the probability of its truth.
Calling on alternative theories of probability makes sense: probability is
a versatile explanatory tool, and the NTV theory has plenty of explaining
to do. In particular, the NTV theory needs to explain why conditionals
seem to have the features of truth-evaluable statements. It is sometimes
reasonable to believe a conditional—but ordinarily, to believe something
is to believe that it is true. Likewise, it is sometimes reasonable to assert
a conditional—but ordinarily, to assert something is to claim that it is
true. Arguments with conditionals in their premises and conclusions are
sometimes valid and sometimes invalid—but ordinarily, a valid argument
is one that cannot have true premises and a false conclusion, and it’s not
clear how to fruitfully apply the concept of validity when a premise or
conclusion lacks truth conditions altogether.
Adams (1975) and Edgington (1986) give a probabilistic account of
belief in conditionals. Belief comes in degrees, which are measured by
probabilities. A person’s degree of belief in a conditional is simply her
conditional degree of belief in its consequent on its antecedent.
Adams (1975) gives a probabilistic account of validity for conditionals.
An argument is said to be probabilistically valid just in case it is impossi-
ble for its premises to be probable and its conclusion improbable. More
precisely, an argument from premises P1, P2, . . . , Pn to conclusion C is valid
just in case, for every real number e > 0, there is a real number δ > 0 such
that, if each of P1, P2, . . . , Pn has probability greater than 1− δ, then C has
probability at least 1− e.
Adams’ definition of validity coincides with the classical definition
where P1, P2, . . . , Pn and C are conditional-free sentences, and lets us define
validity for arguments containing simple conditionals. The theory is built
to handle only simple conditionals, and does not let us assess validity
for arguments containing compound sentences with conditionals as parts.
McGee (1989) extends Adams’ theory to cover compounds of conditionals.
Edgington (1995) gives a non-probabilistic account of what it is to
assert a conditional: it is to assert the consequent if the antecedent is true,
and to assert nothing otherwise. She argues that her account assimilates
conditional assertions to a larger class of conditional speech acts, including:
Conditional Questions. ‘If he phones, what shall I say?’
Conditional Commands. ‘If he phones, hang up.’
Conditional Promises. ‘If he phones, I promise not to be rude.’
Conditional Agreements. ‘If he phones, we’re on for Sunday.’
Conditional Offers. ‘If you phone, you can have a 20% discount.’
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Any speech act whatsoever, she claims, can be performed conditionally
or unconditionally. We can think of conditionals as ‘speech act bombs’
primed to detonate when and only when the antecedent is true (see Egan,
2009).
8 dynamic semantics
So far, we’ve seen several accounts of conditionals that posit more to their
meanings than truth conditions—either because conditionals have no truth
conditions (on the NTV account) or because their truth conditions are
not sufficient to determine when they can reasonably be asserted (on the
material conditional account). Enter dynamic semantics, which provides
new tools for modeling meaning.
Dynamic semantics explains the meanings of sentences by appeal to a
conversational context—a set of background assumptions taken for granted
by all the participants in a conversation. For instance, if a group of friends
is discussing where to go for lunch, the conversational context might
include the information that among the nearby restaurants are Veggie
Garden and Buddha’s Palace. The context set is a set of worlds compatible
with those background assumptions (see Stalnaker, 1999, p. 84).11
The conversational context changes as the conversation progresses, and
the context set shrinks and grows accordingly. When a participant makes
an assertion, then the content of the assertion is added to the context, and
all the worlds incompatible with what is asserted are eliminated from the
context set. For instance, if someone asserts that Veggie Garden is open,
then the worlds where Veggie Garden is closed are eliminated from the
context set.
Figure 8 depicts the effect of asserting ‘Veggie Garden is open today’ on
the context set. The original context set is shown in the rectangle at the
top of the figure: the circles depict worlds. Each world is labeled with a
set of propositions true at that world: ‘BP’ stands for ‘Buddha’s Palace is
open’; ‘VG’ stands for ‘Veggie Garden is open’; and ‘TD’ stands for ‘we
can get gluten-free tofu dogs’.
Notice that some assertions have no effect on the context set. If someone
were to assert ‘Buddha’s Palace is open’, none of the worlds in the context
set would be eliminated. This is because ‘Buddha’s Palace is open’ is al-
ready acceptable in the original context—it follows from what is accepted.
11 To give a complete theory of conditionals, the conversational context will need to include
more information than just the context set. Other proposed parameters include a probability
function or set of probability functions (Yalcin, 2007, 2012b), and a function that ranks
worlds from most to least likely (Spohn, 2015). However, I focus my exposition on the
context set to provide a simple illustration of the main ideas.
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w1
BP
VG
TD
w2
BP
¬VG
TD
w3
BP
¬VG
¬TD
(a) The original context set
w1
BP
VG
TD
(b) The context set after an assertion of ‘Veggie Garden is open’
Figure 8: The effects of an assertion on the context set
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Starr (2014) proposes that within this dynamic semantics framework,
conditionals can be understood as tests, along the lines of the Ramsey test.
To determine the effect of asserting a conditional ‘if A, then B’ on a context
c, we first suppose A, by considering the context c[A] that results from
adding A to c. We then check whether B is true under the supposition.
If B is true at c[A], then c ‘passes’ the test, and c remains unchanged.
Otherwise, c ‘fails’ the test. If a conditional passes the test, it is acceptable
in the original context.
This characterization of acceptability, by itself, is not enough to deter-
mine the effect of uttering a conditional in a context where it is not already
acceptable. For instance, suppose you go to pet a dog, and I say ‘if you pet
it, it will bite.’ This conditional doesn’t follow from our shared background
information, but you can use it to rule out possibilities—in particular, those
possibilities where you pet the dog and it does not bite. What explains
the relationship between my utterance and the corresponding change to
the context set? In very broad terms, uttering a conditional should change
the context set so that the conditional becomes acceptable, and the change
involved should be the smallest one that does the job. There are multiple
ways of spelling out what constitutes a minimal change to contextual
information, but the part of the account that deals with acceptability can
be separated from the part that deals with context change.
To illustrate the concept of a conditional test, consider the conditional ‘if
Veggie Garden is open, then we can get gluten-free tofu dogs’, as asserted
in the context depicted by Figure 8a. To perform the test, we first create
a new context, by augmenting the old context with the information that
Veggie Garden is open; the resulting context set is depicted in Figure 8b.
We then check whether, in the new context, ‘we can get gluten-free tofu
dogs’ is acceptable. If so, the old context passes the test, and the conditional
is acceptable in the old context; otherwise, the old context fails the test,
and the conditional is not acceptable in the old context. Starr extends his
account to handle counterfactuals (which use a modified test in which
the context set is expanded with extra possibilities before adding the
information in the antecedent).
Other theorists offer context-dependent truth conditions for conditionals
using the tools of dynamic semantics. Stalnaker (1975) and Williams (2008)
defend a modified closest-worlds theory of indicative conditionals, where,
if w is a world in the context set, every world in the context set is stipulated
to be closer to w than every world outside it. Gillies (2007) and von Fintel
(2001) propose strict conditional theories of counterfactuals, where a set of
salient worlds is fixed by the context. New worlds are added to the set as
the conversation goes on; in particular, if someone asserts a conditional
whose antecedent is false at all the salient worlds, the set is expanded to
include at least one world compatible with the antecedent.
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9 conditionals as modal restrictors
According to Kratzer (2012, p. 86), many of the above views of condition-
als are ‘based on a momentous syntactic mistake.’ Contrary to popular
opinion, she claims, ‘There is no two-place if. . . then connective in the
logical forms for natural languages.’ Instead, conditionals restrict modal
operators.
One can think of modal operators as quantifiers over possible worlds: to
say that necessarily 2+ 2 = 4 is to say that in all possible worlds, 2+ 2 = 4;
to say that possibly pigs fly is to say that in some possible world, pigs fly;
and to say that it will probably rain is to say that in most possible worlds
(on some suitable way of measuring ‘most’), it rains. Like quantifiers,
modal operators can be restricted. To say that necessarily, if the Peano
axioms are true, then 2+ 2 = 4, is to say that in all possible worlds where
the Peano axioms are true, 2 + 2 = 4. Likewise, to say that if pigs had
hollow bones, then possibly pigs would fly, is to say that in some possible
world where pigs have hollow bones, pigs fly, and to say that if there are
cumulus clouds on the horizon, it will probably rain, is to say that in most
possible worlds where there are cumulus clouds on the horizon, it will
rain.
The modal restrictor view is a generalization of work by D. Lewis (1975)
who notes that conditionals can be used to restrict quantifiers. Consider
the following class of examples.
Sometimes
Always
Usually
Never
if a farmer owns a donkey, she feeds it carrots.
The quantifiers ‘sometimes’, ‘always’, ‘usually’, and ‘never’ are what Lewis
calls unselective quantifiers. To say that always, farmers feed donkeys carrots
is to say that for all ways of assigning a farmer to x and a donkey to y,
x feeds y carrots. To add the clause ‘if a farmer owns a donkey’ is to
restrict the quantifier, so that it ranges only over cases where farmer x
owns donkey y.
The modal restrictor view is Y-shaped: it can handle both indicatives
and counterfactuals (Kratzer, 1981). To explain how this works, we need
three ingredients: a modal base, the modal force of an operator, and an
ordering.
According to Kratzer, the context of an utterance supplies a modal base,
or a function f mapping each world w to a set of propositions that is ‘held
fixed’ when we speculate about what might or must have been true at
w. When we consider what is physically possible, the modal base might
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assign to each world the laws of physics that obtain at that world, but
leave out physically contingent truths. When a detective speculates about
who the burglar might be, the modal base might assign to each world
the detective’s evidence at that world. To determine what is possible (or
necessary, or likely) at a world w, we need to quantify over the possible
worlds where the all of the propositions in f (w) are true.12
Different operators are associated with different kinds of modal force—
roughly, different kinds of quantification over possible worlds. The opera-
tors ‘necessarily’, ‘possibly’, ‘it is likely that’, and ‘it is a good possibility
that’ are all associated with different modal forces. Finally, the context of
utterance supplies an ordering source g, which lets us map each world to an
ordering over worlds.13 (One possible interpretation of this ordering is the
‘closeness’ ordering from Section 4.2, but there are others. Conditional and
unconditional statements about what ought to happen use an ordering
source that ranks worlds from most to least ideal.)
We can then say that the conditional ‘Necessarily if A, then B’ is true at
a world w just in case B is true at all the closest A-worlds to w (according
to the ordering g(w)) where all the propositions in f (w) are true. Likewise,
‘Possibly if A, then B’ is true at a world w just in case B is true at some of
the closest A-worlds to w (according to the ordering g(w)) where all the
propositions in f (w) are true, and similarly for other operators with other
modal force. For indicative conditionals, the modal base is some piece
of salient known information. For counterfactual conditionals, the modal
base is empty (and thus, all possible worlds are consistent with it) while
the ordering source is very rich. Kratzer’s account even has the material
conditional account as a special case, where the modal base maps each
world w to a set of propositions true only at w, and the strict conditional
as another special case, where the modal base is empty and the ordering
source is completely noncommittal, invariably ranking all worlds on a par
with each other.
‘Bare’ conditionals cause trouble for the modal restrictor view. Con-
ditionals supposedly restrict modal operators, but where is the modal
12 Kratzer’s theory could be reformulated in terms of a familiar two-place accessibility
relation among worlds. We might say that world x is accessible from world w (Rwx in
the usual formalism) if and only if all of the propositions in f (w) are true at x. A few
complications arise when the modal base maps some worlds onto inconsistent sets of
propositions. Kratzer wants to say that in such cases, there are non-trivial facts about
what is possible; she gives the example of a modal base that assigns to each world the
set of propositions that are required by a group of Maori elders in that world (Kratzer,
1981, pp. 16-20). In one world w, the elders disagree amongst themselves, and so their
requirements are inconsistent. Nonetheless, there are non-trivial facts about what is
necessary at w according to the elders’ requirements; Kratzer claims that the structure of
the set f (w) of propositions plays an essential role in determining what is necessary.
13 Kratzer’s ordering source officially maps worlds to sets of propositions, which are then
used to create an ordering. I omit this extra step.
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operator in a conditional like ‘If the lights in his study are on, then Roger is
home’? Kratzer (1979, 1981) argues that conditionals without overt modal
operators nonetheless contain implicit modal operators; the underlying
logical form of the example conditional is ‘(MUST: the lights in his study
are on) Roger is home’; the epistemic ‘MUST’ is unspoken.
Heim (1982) provides evidence for Kratzer’s modalized interpretation
of bare conditionals in the form of ‘donkey sentences’ like ‘If John owns
a donkey, then he feeds it carrots’. On at least one plausible reading, our
sample donkey sentence means that John feeds carrots to every donkey
he owns—or in more cumbersome terms, for every x such that x is a
donkey and John owns x, John feeds x carrots. If the conditional were an
ordinary two-place connective, we would have trouble explaining how the
same variable x, bound by the same quantifier, could occur in both the
antecedent and the consequent of the donkey sentence. The conditional
would have the form A→ B, where A contained a quantifier ranging over
donkeys. But Kratzer’s restrictor analysis, together with the assumption
that bare conditionals contain a tacit necessity operator, gives the correct
reading, while providing a uniform treatment of bare and modalized
conditionals.
It is often claimed that Kratzer’s modal restrictor theory allows us to
escape the triviality results of Section 7. Rothschild (2013), for instance,
suggests that Kratzer can escape the triviality results by denying the
thesis. To illustrate Rothschild’s argument, let’s consider the conditional I
originally used to motivate the thesis.
ACE. If I draw a red ace, then it will be the ace of hearts.
I accept the conditional:
CHANCY ACE. With probability 1/2, if I draw a red ace, then it will be
the ace of hearts.
Rothschild suggests that on Kratzer’s account, chancy ace does not
express the thought that ace has probability 1/2, or the thought that the
probability of ace’s being true is 1/2. When I assert chancy ace, I am
not asserting that ace has probability 1/2. Furthermore, when I am 50%
confident that if I draw a red ace, it will be the ace of hearts, this does not
amount to my being 50% confident that ace is true.
Charlow (2015) argues that even if Rothschild is right, Kratzer’s account
is still vulnerable to the triviality result, since Equation 5 and Equation 8
can be motivated independently of the thesis. He goes on to argue that
other easy ways out of the triviality result fail on the modal restrictor view.
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10 conclusion
Conditionals are important in both everyday reasoning and philosophical
argument. There are conditional beliefs, conditional assertions, and con-
ditional propositions, all of which can figure in arguments. The theories
canvassed in this article try to systematize the broad range of data about
which conditionals seem true, and which inferences seem valid. More
phenomena remain to be explained: this article has focused on conditional
beliefs and assertions, and on conditionals in English.
We can gather the similarities among the accounts discussed above into
a sort of rake-shaped theory (a generalization of Bennett’s concept of a
Y-shaped theory), with a short ‘handle’ that captures what is common
to all conditionals, which then splits into many ‘tines’ that capture the
particularities of individual theories. All of the theories we have considered
so far have the following commitments in common.
1. Conditionals are evaluated at ‘points’.
2. To evaluate a conditional ‘if A, then C’ at a point p, one generates a
new point q by adding the information in A to p.
3. The evaluation of the consequent C at q is the evaluation of the entire
conditional at p.
The accounts disagree about the natures of points, what status conditionals
and their consequents should be evaluated for, and what adding an an-
tecedent amounts to. Table 1 summarizes how different views answer this
question. (NB: Selection function and relevant logic accounts typically treat
the initial point and the new point as belonging to different types—the
initial point is a world, while the new point is a set of worlds. But we can
ensure that both points are of the same type by rewriting the theory so
that the initial point is a singleton set of one world; this is what I have
done in Table 1.)
Within each of the accounts, there are open questions: the nature of the
selection function; the correct interpretation of counterpossibles; how best
to respond to the triviality theorems; what makes a conditional believable
or assertable in a given context; how to handle bare modals on the restrictor
account.
There are also open questions about how the accounts interact. Some
accounts seem to be special cases of others: the past predominance view is
a way of filling in the meaning of ‘closest’ on the closest-worlds account.
At other times, different accounts appear to be rivals: it can’t be both that
indicative conditionals have the truth conditions given by the material
interpretation, and that they lack truth values. At other times, they seem to
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be modeling different domains: as with Pearl’s causal modeling theory of
counterfactuals and Starr’s dynamic semantics theory of indicatives. Much
of the interest for future research lies in understanding the interactions
between the different models of conditionals.
If conditionals are useful in a wide variety of domains, from childhood
development to everyday reasoning to philosophy, then conditionals are
well worth studying. I have given reasons for thinking that conditionals are
useful in a wide variety of domains. You may draw your own conclusions.
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